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NOTES
Smith:
Occupational Diseases

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
It is impossible to ascertain when man first became concerned
with occupational diseases. It is estimated, however, that the problem is as old as man himself. Tablets that are remnants of the
Babylonian civilization refer to lead poisoning and pulmonary diseases
of the workers. Physicians of the Greek and Roman cultures developed masks that were used by vermillion workers to protect them
from metallic dust. There are accounts of the terrible suffering of
women and children who worked in copper mines in Egypt as early
as 5000 B.c.1
Apart from sporadic recognition, it was not until the Industrial
Revolution of the 17th century that the problem was fully acknowledged. The modem factory system, with its crowded conditions
and lack of hygiene, emphasized the scope of the problem, but laissez
faire traditions, together with notions of protection of industry in its
infancy, prevailed. The only basic industrial reforms of the nineteenth
century were attempts to improve the working conditions of women
and children by regulation of hours and by prohibition of night work
and work in various dangerous and unhealthy trades. Preventive
medicine, the work of the industrial engineer in improving the heating,
lighting, ventilation, and sanitation, and the investigation of production techniques in hazardous industries resulted in further innovations
in the early twentieth century.2
Once the problem of industrial accidents and diseases received
careful consideration, workmen's compensation was proposed as desirable legislation to handle the matter. In support of such legislation
was the proposition that the injured worker should be compensated
by the industry that expects to derive advantage from his work.
Moreover, the burden of compensation could be passed on to the
consumer so that those persons who enjoy the product of a business
would ultimately bear the cost of injuries occurring during the preparation of the product. The opposition questioned the propriety of
requiring industry to bear the burden of the accidents of its workers
and maintained that to do so would cripple the system of free enterprise. This controversy was an early manifestation of the twentieth
century American struggle between the proponents of social legislation and those of laissez faire notions. At the outset, courts and
legislatures were highly protective toward budding industry; later, as
industry became more fully developed, it was recognized that a
certain number of accidents would occur regardless of precautions,
1. 7 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. Industrial Hygiene 705-07 (1950).
2. Id. at 707.
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and that the cost of compensation should be included in the cost of
production and passed on, via the price mechanism, to the ultimate
consumer. However, compensation for industrial diseases lagged
behind accident coverage in the United States. The early acts afforded no relief for the occupationally diseased, compensation being
limited solely to the victims of an industrial accident. Any extension
of coverage to occupational diseases was opposed on the ground that
industry could not afford the cost of compensation. The concern was
particularly strong regarding the effect of such compensation in those
industries in which silicosis was prevalent, and this apprehension
increased when, immediately after the introduction of the Wisconsin
Workmen's Compensation Act, insurance premiums for monument
workers soared higher than payrolls. 3 The lack of coverage has also
been explained on the ground of the absence of any common law
remedy. 4 As late as 1935, the Illinois Occupational Disease Act was
held unconstitutional because it extended relief that had "no common
law origin or history,"5 illustrating the typical judicial hostility toward
the liberal legislation characterizing that era. Even more significant
was the general opposition to all forms of social legislation. The
development of coverage for those disabled by the industrial disease,
as well as the industrial accident, was considered tantamount to
coercing industry to provide health insurance for all its workers. The
greatest hurdle to be surmounted in providing compensation for the
victim of the occupational disease was the force of public opinion and
pressure groups marshaled together to defeat social legislation. Today
this political hurdle has been overcome and the occupational disease
is compensable in forty-seven states. 6
Before the occupational disease was compensable, it was distinguished from its counterpart, the industrial accident. It was insisted
that an industrial disease is not unexpected, but rather the result of
a continued exposure to the conditions of a particular employment;
it was not a sudden occurrence, but a gradual evolution. Now, how7
ever,
The important boundary becomes ... not that separating occupational disease from accident, since compensability lies on
both sides of that boundary but the boundary separating
3. 1 LAnSON, WoPximm's COMPENSAON §41.20, at 599 (1952).
4. Id. at 598.
5. Boshuizen v. Thompson & Taylor Co., 360 Ill. 160, 195 N.E. 625 (1935).
The act was later upheld as being a reasonable exercise of the state's police power
in People ex rel. Radium Dial Co. v. Ryan, 371 Ill. 597, 21 N.E.2d 749 (1939).
6. 1 LASON, WonxamN's COMPENSATION §41.11, at 593 (1952, Supp. 1962,
at 304).
7. 1 LAmoN, Wowmcmn's COMPENSATION §41.32, at 601 (1952).
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occupational diseases from diseases that are neither accidental
nor occupational, but common to mankind and not distinctively
associated with the employment.
Generally, there are two statutory approaches today to handling the
question what is an occupational disease: the definition type and
the schedule type statute. The definition type statute provides relief
in general terms for those diseases that are caused by an environment
creating a hazard of contraction greater for the worker than that to
which the general public is exposed. The schedule type statute
merely announces the specific ailments for which recovery may be
had. The courts are quite liberal in granting relief if armed with a
general coverage statute having no definite limits. Thus, in one case
a telephone operator who contracted tuberculosis from a close fitting
mouthpiece was afforded relief.8 Those remaining states in which
the schedule type statutes exist are lagging behind in affording compensation for ailments newly identified by medical science and those
arising from industrial innovations. If hamstrung with a schedule
type statute, the judiciary has no power to add to the list regardless
of how obvious the causal connection between the malady and the
working environment may be.
THE LmIrs OF COi"ENSALE DisEAms

Under a general statute the courts are faced with the continuing
task of inclusion and exclusion of diseases. Thus, the decisions on
workmen's compensation in various jurisdictions must be examined
in order to ascertain the approximate limits of compensation for
disability. The fundamental basis of recovery is the requirement
of a causal connection between the conditions of employment and the
ensuing ailment. In order for there to be a causal connection, it is
often stated that the disease must not be common to all mankind and
must be distinctive of the particular conditions of employment. 9 It
is inevitable that the application of these standards produces some
controversial distinctions. Thus, blindness resulting from a detached
retina in the eye of a saleswoman in the book department of a store
was held not to be compensable.' 0 There was, however, a successful
recovery by an employee in a rayon manufacturing plant, who suffered an eye injury from sulfuric acid fumes that were a by-product
of the manufacturing process." In the latter case the court apparently
8. Mason v. Y.W.C.A., 271 App. Div. 1042, 68 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1947).

9. Industrial Comm'n v. Roth, 98 Ohio 34, 120 N.E. 172 (1918).
10. Carpenter v. Sibley, Lindsay & Cur Co., 277 App. Div. 801, 96 N.Y.S.2d

923 (1950).
11. Martin v. Tubize-Chatiflon Corp., 17 S.E.2d 915 (Ct. App. Ga. 1941).
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could identify with a greater degree of certainty a causal link between occupational environment and the injury. Although there are
obvious difficulties in reaching such a determination of causation, it
must be recognized that this limitation is the only buffer between the
law of workmen's compensation as it exists today and mandatory
health insurance.
An occupational disease is one that is caused by conditions incident
to the occupation, and has its origin in the inherent nature or mode of
work of the profession. Therefore, if a disease is not a customary or
natural result of the profession per se, but rather is the consequence of
some extrinsic condition or independent agency, the disease or injury
cannot be imputed to the occupation and it is in no accurate sense
an occupational disease.' 2 In order to determine whether the disease
is characteristic of a particular occupation, a double-edged test has
been suggested. This test is whether the employment conditions
actually caused the disability, and whether these conditions were
peculiar to the employment in the sense that they were encountered
there in a degree beyond that prevailing in employment generally.' 3
A difficult problem in determining a causal connection is that of
distinguishing the occupational disease from those ailments to which
all mankind is exposed. The standard that the courts use in drawing
this distinction is whether the disability arose from conditions
characteristic to the defendants' business. 1 4 The conditions of employment that distinguish the occupational disease from the ordinary
diseases of life need not necessarily consist of unusual poisons, germs,
chemicals or dusts. The conditions may be distinctive because
familiar elements are present in excessive degree. Thus, an undue
exposure to extreme temperatures may cause a subsequent malady
to be identified as an occupational disease. For example, a butcher
who was compelled to remain in a refrigerated cooler longer than
usual suffered a sudden chill that later developed into fatal pneumonia; his estate was allowed to recover completely. 15 On the other
hand, an employee operating a machine making building blocks from
ashes, sand, and cement developed cancer of the foot from the repeated irritation of sand and ashes in his shoes, but was not allowed to
12. Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 358, 128 Atl. 635
(1925); Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 66 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. 1951); Davis v. City of
Winston-Salem, 66 S.E.2d 28 (N.C. 1951).
13. LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 24 A.2d 253 (1942).
14. Underwood v. National Motor Castings Div., 45 N.W.2d 286 (Mich.
1951); Carter v. International Detrola Corp., 328 Mich. 367, 43 N.W.2d 890

(1950).
15. Wolfe v. Brohman, 260 App. Div. 816, 22 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1940), aff'd,
285 N.Y. 635, 33 N.2E2d 557 (1941).
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recover for an occupational disease. 1 It can be seen from this simple
example that an unending chore faces the courts as they are constantly
called upon to make distinctions, corresponding to that between tipping a 125-pound weight and carrying a 40-pound object, on the
ground that one is common to conditions of particular employments
and the other is not.'7 A statutory distinction is sometimes drawn between contagious or infectious diseases and occupational diseases, with
a disallowance of compensation for the former.18 Some infectious or
contagious diseases are the result of an immediate connection with a
place of employment such as a hospital or sanitarium, and the statutes
accordingly afford relief; tuberculosis is the typical example. Among
the more unusual claimants receiving compensation for tuberculosis
have been a missionary in contact with persons suffering from active
tuberculosis in Alaska, 19 a meat packing company's employee, 20 a
worker in the hold of a dusty ship, 21 and an insulator of electric wiring
22 It is not
when the insulating process produced noxious fumes.
uncommon for the courts to find that a claimant is exposed to a
greater than ordinary hazard if the worker is exposed to a diseased
fellow worker, even though the nature of the work is not akin to
medical science. A typical example occurred when a St. Paul policeman, who from time to time occupied the same patrol car with a
tubercular fellow officer, was granted compensation when he con23
tracted the disease.
It must be recognized that a particular social policy favored by
the judiciary may influence any test of causal connection. The courts
tend to show a natural sympathy for the employee who has grown
old at his job, whether his disease is merely a common ailment of
old age, or the result of a gradual evolution because of continued
exposure to conditions of employment. Varicose veins of the legs of a
waiter who was required to remain on his feet constantly over the
course of his twenty-five years of employment, were held to be suffi16. Bollinger v. Wagaraw Bldg. Supply Co., 122 N.J.L. 512, 6 A.2d 396
(1939).
17. 1 LAnsoN, Womasms COiwENSA-nON §41.50, at 608 (1952).
18. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §169 (1958).
19. Board of Natl Missions of Presbyterian Church in United States v. Alaska
Indus. Bd., 116 F. Supp. 625 (D.C. Alaska 1953).
20. Adams v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 348 Mich. 295, 82 N.W.2d. 871
(1957). But see Bishop v. Comer & Pollock, 251 App. Div. 492, 297 N.Y. Supp.

946 (1937).
21. Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464, (C.A. 2d, Cir. N.Y. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939).
22. Watkins v. National Ee. Prods. Corp., 165 F.2d 980 (C.A. 3d Cir. Pa.
1948).
23. Gray v. City of St. Paul, 84 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1957).
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cienfly distinctive of the employment to justify compensation. 24
Another claimant worked for the defendant for twenty-three years
during which he pushed a lever 500 to 700 times a day in the operation
of a machine which staffed mattresses. He recovered compensation
for bursitis of the shoulder since a causal connection existed between
the disability and the work. 25 A second situation in which policy
prevails is manifested by the courts' recognition that some individuals
may have a greater propensity to contract an ailment under given
conditions than other individuals. Even though a disease is attributable to some extent to the individual claimants allergy or weakness
combined with employment conditions, it may be considered an occupational disease if the increased exposure occasioned by employ26
ment in fact brought on the disease.
FLOBuDA LAw

The Florida Legislature, in enacting a statute on occupational
diseases,2 T followed the trend of most jurisdictions and created a
general definition rather than a schedule type statute. Any analysis
of this legislation must to a large degree be confined to the abstract
language of the statute, since its provisions have been subjected to
little judicial construction. The legislature defined an occupational
disease so as to include "only a disease which is due to causes and
conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
trade, occupation, process or employment, and to exclude all ordinary
diseases of life to which the general public are exposed." 28 The
statute is explicit in limiting the scope of the section to any disease
which "has resulted from the nature of the employment in which the
employee was engaged under such employer and was actually contracted while so engaged...... 29 The application of this limitation
is illustrated by a case in which the employee of a funeral home
worked over 100 hours per week, and was on call twenty-four hours
per day when on duty.30 In addition to operating ambulances, he was
required to assist in autopsies and the embalming of bodies. While
24. Wildermuth v. B.P.O. Elks Club (Lodge 621), 5 App. Div. 2d 911, 170
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1958).
25. Bondar v. Simmons Co., 23 N.J. Super. 109, 92 A.2d 642 (1952), aff'd,
12 N.J. 361, 96 A.2d 795 (1953).
26. 1 LAIRSoN, WOMM eS COMPENSAON §41.60, at 608 (1952).

27.
28.
29.

FLA. STAT. §440.151 (1961).
FLA.STAT. §440.151(2) (1961).
FLA. STAT. §440.151(1)(a)

(1961).

30. Ferguson v. Fannin Funeral Home, 3 F.C.R. 403 (Workmen's Comp. Div.
Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 114 So. 2d 447 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), 116 So. 2d 774
(Fla. 1959).
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performing the latter function he handled and removed internal
organs, washed the bodies, and packed all body orifices. The evidence disclosed that prior to his illness he had assisted in the autopsies
and later embalmed the bodies of three persons whose death was
caused by tuberculosis. The deputy commissioner's finding of a direct
causal connection between the claimant's employment and working
conditions and his contraction of tuberculosis was supported by
medical testimony. Therefore, the hazard of contracting the illness
as a result of this employment was ruled to be in excess of that to
which the general public is exposed, and compensation was granted.
The Florida statute contains in several instances provisions that
preclude or limit the amount of recovery. One such instance involves
the application of a rule of construction for the Workmen's Compensation Act to the effect that the "employer takes the employee as he
finds him."a 1 Thus, the risk of hiring a disabled employee is placed
squarely upon the employer. However, to further the legislative
policy encouraging the employment of the disabled, the statute provides a means by which the employer may protect himself. 2 If upon
hiring the worker the employer secures a written statement that the
employee has not been previously disabled or compensated for an
industrial disease, when in fact he has, no further compensation for
that particular disease may be obtained. In construing the statute,33
the Florida Supreme Court established an additional test to determine
whether the claimant is to be denied recovery because of the falsification of such a written statement. Claimant falsely denied in a
written statement that she had sustained a previous back injury, and
therefore she was denied compensation when she later suffered a
recurrence. The court held that to preclude the benefits for an otherwise compensable injury, the employer must show not only a causal
relationship between the prior "injury and the false representation,"34
but also that: the employee knew the representation to be false, the
employer relied upon the false representation, and such reliance
resulted in consequent detriment to the employer.
A second limitation upon recovery occurs if a worker suffers from
an ailment that may be due to some congenital defect or may have
been contracted in an environment extraneous to the occupational
setting. In the event the industrial disease is aggravated by another
disease or infirmity not compensable itself or if the industrial disease
31. Borden's Dairy v. Zanders, 42 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1949); Davis v. Artley
Constr. Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So. 2d 255 (1944).

32.

FLA. STAT. §440.151(5)

(1981).

33. Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961).
34. Id. at 406.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

7

UNIVERSITY
LAW
Florida OF
LawFLORIDA
Review, Vol.
16, REVIEW
Iss. 3 [1963], Art.[Vol.
6 XVI

contributes to the extraneous ailment, recovery is allowed only for
that portion of the disease caused by the occupation. 3 5 The legislature
has furnished a formula for making this determination:
damage attributable to
Measure of worker's
compensation

occupational disease
damage attributable to
all disease

allowable
if
x recovery
occupational
disease
were the sole cause

A third factor that seemingly lessens the opportunity for recovery
of compensation is the denial to the occupationally diseased of those
presumptions in favor of recovery that are afforded the accident
claimants.36 The accident claimant is afforded protection by the
37
rebuttable presumptions that:
(1)
(2)
(3)
of the
(4)
injured

the claim comes within the provisions of the chapter;
sufficient notice of such claim has been given;
the injury was not occasioned primarily by the intoxication
injured employee;
the injury was not occasioned by the wilful. intention of the
employee to injure or kill himself or another.

There are no parallel presumptions for the occupationally diseased,
since the legislature apparently feared the possibility that, in the area
of occupational diseases, industry might pay for ailments for which
it was not responsible. In actual operation, however, the recalcitrance
of the legislature may be ameliorated by the judiciary, and the lack
of any presumptions in favor of recovery may have little or no effect
on the claimant's chances for compensation. Thus, the courts may
achieve the same result by applying an unarticulated rule that the
statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. This
approach is illustrated by the case of Wesley v. Worth Paint and
HardwareCompany,38 which involved a painter who allegedly suffered
from lead poisoning. The diagnosing physician was by no means sure
that the claimant's ailment was in fact lead poisoning, but the Commission nonetheless allowed the claimant to recover. The circuit
court reversed on the ground that claimant had not met the burden of
proof. The Florida Supreme Court reinstated the claimant's judgment
despite the "no presumption" defenses of the employer. The court
35. FLA. STAT. §440.151(1)( ) (1961).
36. FLA. STAT. §440.23 (1961).
387. FA.STA. §440.23 (1961).
88. 52 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1951).
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concluded that the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission
were not to be overturned in the absence of a showing that they were
clearly erroneous.
Recovery by the claimant is affected by another instance of
judicial construction of the workmen's compensation law. The disabled worker often suffers from a malady that could have been engendered by the working conditions of any one of several jobs; a determination must be reached as to which of the working environments was
the one in which the employee was last injuriously exposed to the
hazards of the disease, thereby rendering that employer liable for the
disability. In such a situation, the statute in effect places the burden
of compensation upon the employer under whom the worker suffered
his last injurious exposure, and makes no provision for contribution
from the other employers.3 9 Thus, this statutory provision obviates
the necessity of making the impossible measurement of the contribution of each employment to the disease. In the case of a sufferer from
a dust disease, there is a special restriction that he must have worked
for the last employer at least sixty days in order to recover.
In the determination of the employer's liability, the controlling
factor is the time when the disability became permanent and not
when the disease was initially developed. 40 If the disablement was
subsequent to the termination of the employment, the employer is
not liable. Therefore, if the worker is later injuriously exposed to the
hazards of the disease, the original employer is not responsible for
compensation. On the other hand, if the claimant was not subjected
to such exposure after the first employment, and if any recurrence of
the disease is causally related to the original exposure, then the last
employer is liable for compensation for such recurrences. The courts
have drawn some rather fine distinctions in this matter. In the case
of Masscias v. Tri-City Tile Company41 the claimant had worked as
a tile setter for several employers engaged in the same type of
business, here identified as A, B, C, and D, in respective chronological order. The evidence established that the claimant contracted
dermatitis while in the employment of A, and that he received compensation. Claimant suffered attacks during the subsequent periods of
42
employment with B, C, and D. The Commission stated that:
[lf a claimant suffered injurious exposures in the employ of four
successive employers, with periods of disability and remission
39.

FLA. STAT.

§440.151(5) (1961); Mundy v. McLean, 72 So. 2d 275 (Fla.

1954).
40. Mundy v. McLean, 72 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1954).
41. 2 F.C.R. 120 (Workmen's Comp. Div. Fla. 1956).
42. Id. at 123.
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preceding his re-employment each time, it is possible that each
employer would be liable for the period of disability which
immediately followed the exposure in his employ, as with respect to each period of disability the employee had been "last
injuriously exposed" in the employ of a different employer.
The court decided that the Deputy Commissioner's finding, that
claimant's last injurious exposure was incurred during the period of
employment by A, was unsupported by the evidence; claimant
may have been injuriously exposed during the employ of B, C, or
D. The case was remanded with directions that A was not to be
held liable unless claimant suffered no injurious exposure subsequent
to leaving A. The defense of "voluntary exposure" was not allowed,
because to recognize it would tend to effect a reinstatement of the
defense of contributory negligence. It was pointed out by the court
that the employer could protect himself by requiring the applicant
for employment to state in writing whether he had been previously
disabled; the claimant should not be denied compensation on the sole
basis that at the time of her employment there existed a possibility
43
of recurrence.
The case of Ernest Waters Construction Company v.Mills44 was
distinguished on its facts from Masscias. In Mills, an employee of a
construction company was diagnosed by a physician as being allergic
to damp weeds and stagnant water. He recovered compensation
from his first employer until he was declared cured. Notwithstanding
warnings by a physician, claimant secured employment with two
subsequent employers that exposed him to the same working
conditions. Claimant was not allowed to recover compensation from
the original employer for the ailment resulting from his subsequent
employment because he failed to show a causal connection between
the hazards of the original employment and subsequent attacks.
Further, although the court did not explicitly rule that claimant could
not recover from his more recent employers, it appeared disenchanted
with his plight. Thus, even though assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are not permissible defenses in workmen's compensation actions, the court utilized an assumption of the risk notion
and denied recovery since compensation "is not contemplated for
injuries voluntarily inflicted." 45
43. See FLA. STAT. §440.151(6) (1961); Patton v. Marseilles Hotel, 1 F.C.R.
73 (Workmen's Comp. Div. Fla. 1954).
44. 51 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1951). But see Jenkins v. Manze Tile Co., 3 F.C.R.
153 (Workmen's Comp. Div. Fla. 1958), cert. granted, Crane Tile Co. v. Jenkins,
105 So. 2d 795 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
45. Id. at 182. But see 2 F.C.R. 120 (Workmen's Comp. Div. Fla. 1956).
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THE DusT DisEAm
When legislation on occupational diseases was first enacted, dust
diseases such as silicosis and asbestosis were prevalent occupational
diseases. The profusion of such respiratory ailments in industrial
workers caused the feeling that industry could not bear the cost of
compensation. Accordingly, a common feature of the workman's
compensation acts is that compensation for the dust diseases is
determined by different standards from those applied to accidents or
other types of occupational diseases.
The draftsmen of the Florida statute have been similarly cautious
in affording a means of recovery for silicosis, asbestosis, and other
dust diseases. The worker is denied relief unless he is physically
unable to engage in any remunerative employment. The Florida
statute provides that disability or death from these diseases is
presumed not to be characteristic of the employment unless, during
the ten years preceding the date of disablement, the employee is
exposed to the inhalation of silica dust or asbestos dust over a period
46
of at least five years, two years of which shall have been in this state.
However, if the worker was employed by the same employer during
the entire five-year period, his right to compensation against the
employer is not affected by the fact that he was employed outside the
state during any part of this period.
The legislature adjusted the flood gates to meet an onslaught of
claims for asbestosis and silicosis by creating a transitory period, beginning with the month of passage of the section in 1945, in which
recovery was limited to $500. The allowable compensation was
progressively increased for each ensuing month at the rate of $50
month until the ceiling of the benefits allowable for respective claims
under the workmen's compensation schedule is met; accordingly, the
maximum allowable recovery for any claim today is roughly $11,000.
CONCLUSION

The physical suffering consequent to an industrial disease must
be borne by the employee alone, but in addition to this burden there
is a loss of earning power-a loss of that which is the stock in trade of
an employee. This is a loss arising out of the business, and is an
expense of operation as much as the cost of repairing broken
machinery or any other expense that ordinarily is paid by the
employer. By relieving the blameless employer of liability, the law
was at the same time encumbering other equally blameless persons
with the burden of industrial diseases. Industry should be required
46. FLA.

STAT.

§440.151(6)(b) (1961).
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in some way or another to bear at least a part of the cost of risks it
has created.
Although society is not ready today, such disabilities as heart
disease may be examples of compensable ailments that loom on the
horizon. Medical science will submit further illustrations in the future.
Though some persons fear that achievements in the nuclear sciences
will result in Armageddon, radiation sickness from industrial sources
could be the bubonic plague of the twentieth or twenty-first century.
In examining the segment of law known as workmen's compensation we note that relief for the industrial disease has lagged behind
that for the accident, both historically and in the attention that the
remedy receives by the practitioner and the state agency established
to control the operation of the act. The Florida Industrial Commission
has both the obligation and authority to make an inquiry into the
subject of occupational diseases. The fact that the Commission has
been dilatory in performing this duty tends to de-emphasize the
importance of the problems. Through fulfilment of this responsibility
the general public as well as the bar could be further enlightened and
the scope of the problem adequately evaluated.
The problem of the industrial disease may well be a sleeping
giant. With medical science advancing in geometric strides, understanding of the problem of the occupational disease will similarly
increase. Workmen's compensation, and the area of industrial diseases
in particular, is a segment of jurisprudence with which even the bar
has only a limited familiarity. Increased awareness by the public of
the problem will expand this area of the law. With society throwing
off the stigma of mental illness, meaningless distinctions between
body and mind are beginning to vanish, and the existing "legal"
barriers47 may similarly be surmounted. The law of tomorrow will
be limited only by the imagination of its advocates and the temper
of the society that it governs.
DONALm L. SmzrrH

47. See Note, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 390 (1960).
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